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in	 cooperation	 with	 the	 peasantry,	 but	 was	 imposed	
on	 them	 by	 the	 State.	 The	 political,	 ideological	
and	 technical	 means	 used	 during	 the	 Democratic	
Kampuchea	 (DK)	 period	 to	 force	 the	 peasantry	 to	 a	
primitive	 accumulation	 in	 the	 agricultural	 sector	 led,	
ex nihilo,	 to	major	 inconsistencies	 between	 the	State	





production	 units,	 the	 Krom Samaki	 groups1,	 carried	
mainly	 by	 a	 relatively	 strong	 peasantry	 if	 compared	
to	 the	 role	of	 the	State	 and	 the	markets	 (Grunewald,	
1987).	 Later,	 in	 the	mid-eighties,	 the	 dismantling	 of	
cooperative	 groups	 and	 the	 re-emergence	 of	 a	 free	
market	 economy	 has	 further	modified	 the	 conditions	
of	 the	 modernization	 of	 the	 peasantry	 through	 the	
implementation	 of	 liberal	 policies,	 legitimated	 in	 the	
belief	 that	property	 rights	 reform,	price	 liberalization	
and	 the	 gradual	 privatization	 of	 enterprises	 would	
result	 in	 improved	 agricultural	 productivity	 and,	
consequently,	 the	 well-being	 of	 the	 rural	 population	




The	 current	 market-based	 agrarian	 transition	
processes	are	accompanied	by	a	number	of	institutional	
shifts	 materialized	 in	 a	 set	 of	 new	 legal	 and	 policy	
documents.	The	cornerstone	of	these	documents	is	the	
new	 land	 law,	 which	 defines	 different	 land	 property	
domains	 (MLMUPC,	 2001;	 East-West	 Management	
Institute,	2003).	In	line	with	the	land	law,	different	land	
tenure	regimes	are	envisioned	and	captured	in	relevant	
land	 or	 natural	 resources	 management	 policies.	 The	
State	domain	is	where	appropriation,	management	and	
control	 of	 land	 and	 natural	 resources	 are	 carried	 out	
through	the	State	agencies	(Kirk,	2000).	The	State	private	
land	consists	of	land	that	the	State	can	use	as	a	private	









in	 the	 late	1990s,	and	 in	accordance	with	 the	overall	
governance	policy	of	promoting	de-concentration	and	
decentralization,	the	State	has	been	promoting	certain	
forms	 of	 devolved	 natural	 resources	 co-management	
with	rural	communities,	namely	Community	Fisheries	
and	 Community	 Forestry	 organizations.	While	 these	





land	 encompasses	 land	 where	 peasant	 families	 can	
claim	ownership	title	on	the	land	they	farm	or	live	on.	
The	 land	 law	 promotes	 the	 titling	 of	 private	 land	 to	





























the	 context	 of	 agrarian	 transition,	 key	messages	with	
policy	 implications	 will	 be	 formulated.	 The	 central	
hypothesis	underlying	the	paper	is	that	peasant	modes	








Mekong	 river	 water	 flow	 that	 seasonally	 becomes	 a	
tributary	 river	of	 the	Tonle	Sap	 river	basin.	Figure 1	
(p	326)	 shows	 an	 agro-ecological	 zoning	 of	 the	
province.	It	stretches	from	the	flat	Tonle	Sap	flood	plain	
(consisting	of	a	sequence	of	flooded	forest,	shrub	and	
grassland)	 to	 the	agricultural	zone	where	 the	villages	
are	 located,	 to	 the	 slightly	undulating	dry	 shrub	 land	
and	then	to	the	forest	area	(a	mosaic	of	dry,	semi	and	








–	 they	 are	 located	 not	 too	 far	 from	Kampong	Thom	
	 city	to	tackle	rural-urban	linkages;	
–	 because	 a	 forest	 cover	 change	 analysis	 detected	
	 recent	land	cover	changes.
2.2. Scope and methods
The	 research	 took	 place	 in	 three	 distinct	 phases,	











updated	 for	 the	 2006	 situation	 though	 detailed	 GPS	
surveys.	After	preliminary	data	processing,	consultative	
workshops	(2	days	per	commune)	were	organized	with	
all	 local	 authorities	 at	 village	 and	 commune	 levels	
in	 order	 to	 interpret	 the	 land	 use	 changes	 identified.	
The	 discussions	 are	 conducted	 by	 using	 qualitative	
and	 quantitative	 questionnaires	 and	 by	 asking	 the	
participants	 to	 comment	 the	 land	 use	 changes	 maps	
printed	on	A0	 size	paper.	They	 are	 facilitated	by	 the	
researcher	 and	 a	 group	 of	 students	 from	 the	 Royal	
University	 of	Agriculture.	 Then,	 participatory	 forest	
inventory	and	vegetation	 surveys	 are	 conducted	with	
villagers	to	understand	their	management	of	forest	and	
fisheries	resources.	The	forest	 inventory	is	conducted	
in	 Trapeang	 Russei	 on	 11	sample	 plots	 identified	 in	
different	 forest	 type	 areas	 (sampled	 area	 represent	
1%	 of	 the	 total	 forest	 area	 size)	 with	 participation	
of	 local	 community’s	 representatives	 who	 identify	
timber	 and	 non-timber	 species,	 specify	 their	 use	 and	
comment	their	availability	trend.	In	Srayov,	vegetation	
surveys	are	conducted	along	two	main	transect	walks	




the	 land	use	change	 in	 the	area	encircling	each	main	
fishing	ground.	Finally,	household	investigations	using	
semi-structured	 questionnaires	 are	 conducted	 with	




a	 semi-structured	 questionnaire	 (62	people,	 34	 in	
Srayov	and	28	in	Trapeang	Russei).




Table 1. Household	surveys	design	—	Dispositif des enquêtes ménage.
Commune Total area  Total population (2005) Household investigations
 (km2) People Households Phase 1 (2005) Phase 2 (2005) Phase 3 (2006) Total
Srayov	 287.17		 18,576	 3,682	 		69	 130	 163	 362
Trapeang	Russei	 143.98	 15,912	 3,240	 		34	 		67	 		66	 167
Total 431.15 34,488 6,922 103 197 229 529
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questionnaire.	 A	 stratified	 random	 sampling	 method	
was	used	to	select	a	group	of	household’s	representative	
of	 the	 whole	 commune	 (6	villages,	 197	households).	
The	 investigation	 is	conducted	by	 the	 researcher	and	
a	 group	 of	 4	students	 from	 the	 Royal	 University	 of	
Agriculture.	In	order	to	assess	the	existing	differences	
in	 labor	 allocation	 strategies,	 primary	 occupations	







The	 third	 phase	 apprehends	 the	 determinants	
of	 land	 and	 labor	 productivities	 for	 the	 rain-fed	 rice	




researcher	 and	 a	 group	of	 6	students	 from	 the	Royal	





was	 constituted	 by	 selecting	 a	 highly	 representative	
group	 of	 households	 in	 each	 village	 (4	villages,	
229	households).	 The	 database	 allows	 the	 structure	
and	functioning	of	the	land	market	to	be	quantified	in	
line	 with	 the	 land-labor	 endowment	 ratio.	 Different	
modalities	of	entry	in	the	land	markets	are	envisioned:	
land	sale,	land	purchase,	land	clearance	and	land	rental.	
The	 database	 details,	 for	 each	 transaction,	 the	 land	
area	 size,	 the	year	and	 reason	of	 sale	and	 the	agreed	
price.	A	 land-labor	 simulation	 model	 was	 then	 built	
to	 reconstruct	 the	 land	 trajectories	of	 the	households	
at	 the	moment	when	 they	enter	 the	 land	market.	The	
land/labor	 ratio	 is	 determined	 by	 the	 total	 land	 size	
area	divided	by	a	household’s	weighted	active	 labor.	
One	person	aged	between	8	and	17	counts	as	0.5	labor	
unit;	 one	 person	 aged	 between	 17	 and	 60	 counts	 as	
1	full	unit	of	labor;	and	people	aged	older	than	60	are	
counted	as	0.5	labor	unit.	
3. RESEARCH FINDINGS AND RESULTS 
3.1. Dynamics of land use and tenure
The	use	of	substantial	areas	has	changed	between	1992	
and	2004	in	both	communes:	15%	and	7%	in	Srayov	
and	 Trapeang	 Russei	 communes,	 respectively.	 As	
illustrated	 in	figures 2	 and	 3 (p	 327),	 these	 changes	
mark	a	huge	print	in	the	landscapes.	This	is	regarded	as	
evidence	of	changes	in	local	agro-systems	and	in	land	
governance.	 Types	 of	 land	 use	 change	 were	 further	
analyzed	according	to	four	main	driving	forces:	
–	 the	 demographic	 pressure	 increasing	 demand	 for	
	 rice;	
–	 the	modalities	 of	 State	 withdrawal	 from	 its	 direct	
	 support	to	peasantry;	
–	 the	 endogenous	 management	 of	 common-pool	
	 resources	by	rural	communities;
–	 the	 increasing	 influence	 of	 non-peasant	 actors	 in	
	 rural	areas.
State support to peasantry.	 In	 the	 context	 of	 the	
dramatic	population	growth	that	occurred	in	the	early	
eighties	 after	 the	 Khmer	 Rouge	 regime,	 the	 main	





different	 forms	 of	 State	 intervention	 and,	 later,	 with	
different	modalities	of	State	withdrawal.	
In	Srayov,	the	population	grew	at	an	average	annual	
rate	 of	 1.57%	 between	 1992	 and	 2005	 (NIS,	 2007).	
The	 need	 to	 produce	more	 rice	 to	 feed	 this	 growing	
population	is	associated	with	State	withdrawal	from	its	
direct	and	indirect	support	to	farmers.	In	the	eighties,	
the	 State	 put	 considerable	 effort	 into	 supporting	 the	
farmers	to	cultivate	deep	water	rice,	a	photo-periodic	
variety	 of	 late-maturing	 paddy	 well	 adapted	 to	 high	
water	depth	and	not	very	demanding	in	terms	of	labor	
and	 capital	 input.	 The	 State	 largely	 subsidized	 the	
production	 (soil	 preparation	 and	 harvest)	 as	 well	 as	
guaranteed	 paddy	 prices	 at	 the	 farm	 gate	 (Pel	 et	 al.,	
2002).	This	direct	support	was	done	through	the	Krom 
Samaki	 production	 units.	 These	 were	 particularly	
active	in	Kampong	Thom	(in	Srayov	in	particular)	due	
the	 large	 flooded	 areas	 and	 contributed	 a	 significant	
amount	 of	 rice	 for	 consumption	 inside	 the	 province.	
The	 production	 surplus	 was	 transferred	 through	 the	
Krom Samaki	system	to	non	self-sufficient	rice	areas.	
Since	 the	 official	 disbandment	 of	 the	 Krom Samaki	
production	 units	 and	 its	 direct	 support	 to	 farmers,	
the	 peasant	 household	 had	 become	 the	 core	 unit	 of	
agricultural	 development.	 Quickly,	 they	 decided	 to	
abandon	the	deep-water	rice	production	and	relocated	
their	 rice-production	 effort	 to	 the	 rice	 plains	 of	 the	
commune	 in	medium	 rice	 (Figure 2)	 due	 to	 security	
reasons	 and	 the	 long	 time	 spent	 in	 accessing	 plot	
sometimes	located	30	km	from	where	they	lived.	
Household	 investigations	 focusing	 on	 their	
evolution	 during	 these	 mutations	 revealed	 that	 the	
families	reduced	areas	under	cultivation,	but	while	the	
distance	 from	 plot	 to	 their	 habitation	 has	 decreased,	
they	could	significantly	increase	their	land	productivity	
by	intensifying	their	labor	(number	of	hours	per	worker)	
and	 their	 cropping	 systems.	 The	 total	 production	 of	
Cambodian	peasant’s	contribution	to	rural	development	 325






armed	 conflicts	 between	 the	Khmer	Rouge	 resistance	










total	 demographic	 increase	 has	 been	 0.77%	 per	 year	
on	average	between	1992	and	2006	(14,249	to	15,912	
people).	 Besides	 the	 much-awaited	 socio-political	
stability,	the	ceasefire	had	serious	consequences	for	the	





Peasant	 families	 have	 spontaneously	 extended	 their	
rice-based	cropping	system	in	these	new	lands.
Endogenous management of Common-Pool 
Resources. Another	driving	force	that	has	contributed	
to	shaping	the	rural	 landscapes	 in	 the	studied	areas	 is	
the	 endogenous	 management	 practices	 of	 common-
pool	resources	by	peasant	communities.	The	Tonle	Sap	
floodplain	 in	Srayov	 (south	of	 the	commune)	and	 the	
mosaic	of	forest	patches	in	Trapeang	Russei	(north	of	
the	commune)	constitute	these	common-pool	resources	
that	 should	 be	 considered	 as	 Public	 State	 land	 under	
the	 new	 land	 law.	 In	 both	 communes,	 the	 common-
pool	 resources,	 though	under	government	authority	 if	








(Figure 2).	 Further	 investigations	 at	 the	 household	
level	and	transect	walks	organized	with	farmers	have	
provided	 detailed	 information	 on	 how	 peasants	 are	
actually	 managing	 this	 seasonally	 flooded	 area.	 The	
plain	is	characterized	by	continually	changing	land	use	










The	 system	 is	 rational.	 The	 different	 rice	 cropping	
systems	 are	 adapted	 for	 different	 water	 depths	 and	
encompass	very	important	aquatic	biodiversity	(Balzer	
et	 al.,	 2002).	 The	 grass	 is	 crucial	 as	 fodder	 for	 the	
cattle	 that	 generate	 significant	 part	 in	 the	 farming	
income	 portfolio,	 and	 the	 shrubs	 are	 also	 important	
for	 the	 energy	 supply	 of	 households	 (i.e.	 firewood).	
Fishing	in	the	ponds	of	the	receding	flood	plain	is	part	
and	parcel	of	this	management,	aiming	at	maintaining	
multi-functional	 agro-ecosystems.	 Tragedy	 of	 the	
common,	 in	 the	 sense	 of	 Hardin	 (1968)	 is	 avoided	
due	to	low	population	pressure	on	land	(64	people	per	
km2	 in	 Srayov),	 which	 enables	 the	 reproduction	 of	
land	fertility	and	reduces	the	risk	of	conflicts	between	
resources	appropriators.
In	 Trapeang	 Russei,	 the	 main	 feature	 was	 the	
diminution/increase	of	forest	cover	in	the	northern	part	
of	the	commune	(Figure 3).	A	forest-based	slash	and	
burn	 system	was	 the	 norm	 in	 the	 area	 until	 the	 start	
of	 the	 sixties	 but	 started	 to	 decline	 afterwards.	 The	
decreasing	fertility	of	 the	overall	 system	is	 the	 result	
of	 increasing	 population	 density	 and	 reduction	 of	
the	 fallow	period	 has	 prevented	 the	 reconstitution	 of	
the	 biomass	 (Mazoyer	 et	 al.,	 2002).	The	 system	was	
progressively	 converted	 into	 a	 permanent	 rice-based	
and	forested	system	in	which	an	extensive	rice	cropping	
system	 (i.e.	 one	 harvest	 a	 year)	 co-exists	with	 forest	
Table 2.	 Changes	 in	 rice	 cropping	 patterns	 between	 1992	 and	 2005	 in	 Srayov	—	Changement des itinéraires culturaux 
rizicoles entre 1992 et 2005 à Srayov.
	 Total commune (wet season rice) For sample from investigation (wet season rice)
 Population  Total rice area  Cultivated area Distance to Yield  Total production per HH
	 (number	of	people)	 cultivated (ha)	 (kg	per	HH)	 habitation (km)	 (kg.ha-1)	 (kg	per	HH)
1992	 14,768	 14,965	 3.2	 10.2	 595.3	 1,898.5
2005	 18,576	 		9,532	 1.2	 		3.1	 955.6	 1,146.7
HH:	household	—	ménage.
} }-	36.3%+	20.5%
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Figure 1.	Location	of	Kampong	Thom	province	and	study	








have	 progressively	 identified	 specific	 forest	 blocks	
where	 protection	 and	 sustainable	 management	
measures	were	 initiated	 by	 them.	These	 efforts	were	
well	in	train	when	the	community	forestry	sub-decree	
was	 released	 in	 2003.	 This	 later	 piece	 of	 legislation	
was	instrumental	in	formalizing	the	recognition	of	the	
protected	area	as	a	community	forest.	A	participatory	
forest	 inventory	 conducted	 with	 local	 dwellers	
(Diepart,	2007a)	was	conducted	in	2006	to	assess	the	




in	 the	 forest	blocks	 that	were	entirely	controlled	and	
managed	by	the	community	both	diversity	and	volume	




conducted	 to	 assess	 the	 impact	 of	 community-based	
natural	 resources	 management	 in	 the	 2000-2007	
period,	 shows	 similar	 results	 for	 community	 forest	
located	 in	 a	 similar	 agro-ecological	 and	 institutional	




in	 rice	 cultivation,	 for	 savings	 and	 for	 production	 of	
manure	that	is	paddy-field	organic	amendments.
Though	there	are	contrasts	in	the	types	of	common-
pool	 resources	 in	 both	 communes,	 the	 management	
of	common-pool	resources	by	peasantry	is	detailed	in	
diversification	 patterns	 and	 risk	 coping	 mechanisms	
that	 enable	 them	 to	make	 sustainable	 use	 of	 limited	
resources	 and	 to	 reduce	 risk	 associated	 with	 their	
reliance	 on	 a	 limited	 number	 of	 products	 in	 their	
livelihood.	 The	 management	 of	 these	 common-pool	
resources	 by	 peasant	 communities	 is	 thus	 a	 positive	
contribution	to	the	maintenance	of	biodiversity.	In	this	
sense,	peasant	communities	have	a	truly	environmental	
function	 in	 their	 landscape.	 Figure 4	 illustrates	 the	
share	 of	 income	 generated	 from	 the	 common-pool	
resources	combined	with	the	other	income	sources.	On	
average,	 the	 share	 of	 fisheries	 and	 forestry	 activities	
in	 the	 total	 added	 value	 is	 quite	 important	 (18%	 for	
fisheries	 in	Srayov	and	15%	for	 forestry	 in	Trapeang	
Russei).	 These	 results	 stress	 that	 the	 integration	 of	
agro-fisheries	 or	 agro-forestry	 activities,	 in	 addition	
of	being	environmentally	sound,	generates	significant	
value	adding	in	the	livelihoods	of	rural	communities.
Influence of non peasant actors in agrarian 
development.	 The	 magnitude	 of	 new	 medium-scale	
agro-industrial	 perimeters	 underlines	 the	 prevailing	
importance	 of	 the	 economic	 environment	 in	 shaping	
rural	landscapes	(Figures 2	and	3).	In	both	communes,	
non-peasant	actors	exerted	a	strong	influence	in	these	
new	 land	 developments.	 In	 Srayov,	 for	 example,	
they	 are	 the	 driving	 forces	 of	 new	 water	 resources	
management	 strategies	 in	 the	 Tonle	 Sap	 flood	 plain.	
As	 an	 illustration	 of	 this,	 in	 the	 late	 nineties,	 one	
local	 private	 entrepreneur	 started	 to	 build	 irrigation	
schemes	consisting	of	one	water	reservoir	and	one	dry	
season	rice	perimeter	each.	Its	principle	is	simple.	The	
floodwater	 is	 stocked	 in	 the	 upper	 reservoirs	 in	 the	
rainy	season	and	flows	by	gravity	from	the	reservoirs	
2 Degens P. & Choun D., 2007. Impact assessment of the 
NRM component. Phnom Penh: GTZ-Rural Development 




































Land use changes in Srayov (1992-2006)
1992 2006
  Land use in 2006 (ha)
	 	 Village Water Flood Paddy Irrigated Shrub Grassland Total
  land body land field perimeter land
	 Village	land	 479.0	 				1.6	 		0.0	 							0.0	 				0.0	 							0.0	 									0.0	 				480.5
	 Water	body	 				1.6	 805.5	 		0.0	 							5.9	 				1.4	 							2.7	 							20.7	 			 837.7
	 Flood	land	 				0.0	 				8.8	 46.1	 							0.0	 				0.0	 							0.0	 							18.0	 					 72.9
	 Paddy	field	 				0.0	 		34.1	 		3.4	 8,663.4	 268.3	 			642.1	 		5,359.0	 14,970.2
	 Shrub	land	 				0.0	 				0.6	 		0.0	 					16.7	 				0.9	 			640.8	 					456.7	 	 1,115.7
	 Grassland	 				0.0	 		15.7	 24.3	 			845.6	 513.2	 			558.1	 		9,283.6	 11,240.6
Total  480.6 866.3 73.8 9,531.6 783.8 1,843.7 15,138.0 28,717.6
Land use changes types
Dismantlement of rice field
Increase shrub cover associated
with decrease grass cover
Decrease shrub cover 
associated with increase
grass cover






Figure 2.	Land	use	and	land	use	changes	maps	in	Srayov	commune	—		Cartes d’occupation du sol et de changement d’occupation 
du sol dans la commune de Srayov (1992-2006).	The	table	quantifies	the	land	use	changes	that	have	intervened	between	1992	and	
2006	—		Le tableau quantifie les changements d’occupation intervenus entre 1992 et 2006.
Figure 3. Land	use	 and	 land	 use	 changes	maps	 in	Trapeang	Russei	 commune	—	Cartes d’occupation du sol et de changement 
d’occupation du sol dans la commune Trapeang Russei (1992-2006). The	table	quantifies	the	land	use	changes	that	have	intervened	



















Rice and perennial crop
Forest and
perennial crop
Land use changes in Trapeang Russei (1992-2006)
1992 2006
Land use changes types
Conversion of forest into perennial
 crop plantation (total)
Conversion of forest into perennial
 crop plantation (partial)
Conversion of forest into paddy
field






  Land use in 2006 (ha)	  
	 	 Water Village  Infra- Paddy Perennial Flooded Forest  Forest  Forest cover Total
     resources	 land structure field crop forest covera coverb + perennial  
          crop
	 Water	 587.4	 				1.3	 		0.0	 			175.7	 				0.1	 		9.2	 						0.0	 							0.0	 				0.0	 		   773.76
	 		resources	
	 Village	land	 				2.2	 684.7	 		0.0	 							7.6	 				2.1	 		0.0	 						0.0	 							0.0	 				0.0	 			  696.56
	 Infrastructure	 				0.0	 				0.0	 28.8	 							0.0	 				0.0	 		0.0	 						0.0	 							0.0	 				0.0	 				   28.80
	 Paddy	field	 		11.2	 		82.6	 		0.0	 6,573.5	 		32.5	 		0.7	 						2.8	 					12.5	 				0.8	 	 6,716.63
	 Perennial	crop					0.0	 				7.1	 		0.0	 					12.6	 		42.5	 		0.0	 						0.6	 							3.3	 				0.0	 				   66.13
	 Flooded	forest			68.6	 				0.0	 		0.0	 							0.0	 				0.0	 25.6	 						0.0	 							0.0	 				0.0	 		     94.21
	 Forest	cover	 				1.2	 		24.2	 		0.0	 			137.5	 313.3	 		0.0	 2,115.6	 			477.2	 324.2	 	 3,393.14
	 Forest	cover	 				0.5	 				5.5	 		0.0	 			156.5	 153.8	 		0.0	 			125.8	 2,159.5	 		27.6	   2,629.22
















Russei,	 one	 pioneer	 investor	 attached	 to	 a	 Vietnam-
driven	cashew	nut	commodity	chain	acquired	a	 large	
area	 of	 degraded	 forest	 and	 converted	 it	 into	 a	 large	
cashew	 plantation.	 In	 both	 communes,	 these	 pioneer	
agricultural	 investors	 were	 integrated	 in	 the	 peasant	
communities	 following	 agreed	 principles.	 Peasant	
communities	 contributed	 in	 the	 time-consuming	 task	
of	patrolling	as	wage	laborer.	Overall,	they	were	well	
integrated	 in	 its	daily	management.	Nevertheless,	 the	
intervention	 of	 these	 pioneer	 entrepreneurs	 has	 been	
followed	 by	 less	 scrupulous	 investors	 who	 initiated	
large	movement	of	uncontrolled	State	land	acquisition	
for	 speculation	 purposes.	 Kampong	 Thom’s	 urban	
elites	are	key	actors	in	these	markets	(Diepart,	2007a).
The	integration	of	these	schemes	in	the	commune	
landscape	 is	 double	 edged.	 On	 the	 one	 hand,	 they	
represent	 new	 options	 for	 the	 development	 of	 the	
region	 as	 well	 as	 new	 employment	 opportunities	








ponds	 or	 forestland	 is	 more	 difficult	 because	 of	 the	
mere	 existence	 of	 the	massive	 perimeters	within	 the	
same	 territory	 (46%	 in	Srayov	and	57%	 in	Trapeang	
Russei).	 In	 Srayov	 in	 particular,	 all	 the	 respondents	
(n	=	69)	acknowledge	that	a	significant	number	of	fish	
fingerlings	are	even	being	caught	inside	the	reservoirs,	
resulting	 in	 a	 decrease	 of	 their	 total	 fish	 catch,	
especially	in	the	recession	ponds	located	in	the	vicinity	
of	the	reservoirs.
These	 agro-ecological	 impacts	 on	 agrarian	 and	
production	 systems	 are	 the	 visible	 expression	 of	
deeper	issues	related	to	the	State	land	tenure	context.	
In	 both	 communes,	 the	 appropriation	 rules	 of	 the	
common-pool	 resources	are	simply	depending	on	 the	
use	 of	 those	 resources	 as	 the	 demographic	 pressure	
on	 land	 is	not	high.	These	 institutional	 arrangements	
are	legitimized	and	approved	by	all	under	the	scrutiny	
of	 village	 and	 commune	 chiefs.	 Nevertheless,	 these	
collective	 rules	 are	 being	 challenged	 by	 the	 new	
possibility	of	land	ownership	offered	by	the	jurisdiction	
of	State	control	(State	public	and	State	private).	State-
controlled	 concessions	 overlap	 with	 the	 collective	
rules	of	peasant	communities,	which	create	confusion	
on	 the	 appropriation	 of	 land	 and	 its	 resources.	 The	
concerned	 agencies	 and	 government	 officials	 derive	
material	benefits	from	this	legal	limbo	surrounding	the	
management	 of	 common-pool	 resources.	 Depending	
on	 the	 land	 area	 involved,	 the	 provincial,	 district	 or	
communal	administration	gives	authorization	 to	each	
individual	investor	for	the	construction	of	a	perimeter	
or	 a	 plantation.	 This	 usually	 requires	 payment	 of	 a	
commission	 (Diepart,	 2007a).	 The	 registration	 of	
those	 lands	 as	 private	 State	 land	 and	 the	 delivery	 of	
an	 economic	 land	 concession	 should	 be	 the	 legal	
procedure	 for	 the	 retention	basins	 or	 plantations,	 but	
the	 documents,	 including	 agreements	 available	 to	
support	 these	 transactions,	 do	 not	 mention	 on	 what	
legal	basis	these	agreements	are	made	(Provincial	Hall	
of	Kampong	Thom,	2005).	Qualitative	 investigations	
with	 various	 local	 stakeholders	 have	 shown	 that	
the	 rights	 to	 own	 State	 land	 as	 private	 property	 are	
given	by	local	administration	(commune,	district,	and	
province)	 along	norms	 that	 are	well	 structured	 along	
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of	political	power	 and	 the	 liberalization	of	 economy,	
resulting	in	very	weak	linkages	and	trust	between	the	
communities	and	the	public	institutions	which	collude	




the	 mediation	 of	 community	 facilitators	 associated	
with	 the	 pagoda	 committee	 and	 entrusted	 by	 fellow	











management.	 They	 definitively	 represent	 a	 form	 of	
peasant	 historic	 governance	 that	 ensures	 collective	
security.
3.2. Organization of family-based labor and income 
formation
The	 recent	 evolution	 towards	 increased	 liberalization	
of	agricultural	 input	and	output	has	 induced	growing	
disparities	 between	 regions	 and	 within	 the	 peasant	
communities	 in	 each	 region.	 This	 evolution	 creates	
a	 tendency	 to	 redistribute	 the	conditions	of	access	 to	
resources	 (land,	 water,	 equipments,	 etc.)	 as	 well	 as	
the	 labor	 allocation	 and	 income	 formation	 strategies	
between	 different	 categories	 of	 producers	 (Lipton,	
2002;	Peemans,	2002;	Diepart	et	al.,	2005;	2007a).
The	monthly	 labor	 intensities	 (in	men.month)	 are	
computed	for	all	people	involved	in	each	activity	and	
presented	on	 a	 seasonal	 calendar	 (Table 3).	 It	 shows	
first	 the	 total	 labor	per	household,	which	can	be	best	
compared	 with	 the	 average	 active	 labor	 force	 per	
Table 3.	Monthly	allocation	of	family-based	labor	per	household	(combined	and	for	each	activity)	—	Allocation mensuelle de 
la main-d’œuvre familiale par ménage (combinée et pour chaque activité).
Srayov	 Households Labor intensities (in men.month per household)
 involved (%) Dry season   Rainy season
	 	 Jan. Feb. March April May June July Aug. Sept. Oct. Nov. Dec. Average
Total	 100	 1.16	 1.20	 1.16	 1.00	 2.98	 3.07	 3.08	 3.16	 3.21	 3.24	 3.22	 2.69	 2.43
Agriculture/	 		95	 0.18	 0.20	 0.23	 0.21	 2.47	 2.53	 2.53	 2.53	 2.53	 2.53	 2.37	 1.84	 1.68
		livestock
Fisheries	 		34	 0.89	 0.96	 0.80	 0.46	 0.30	 0.37	 0.50	 0.70	 0.78	 0.78	 0.93	 0.87	 0.70
Agricultural		 				3	 0.50	 0.50	 0.50	 1.00	 0.50	 0.50	 0.50	 0.50	 0.50	 0.50	 1.00	 1.00	 0.63
		wage	labor
Non	farm	with		 		18	 1.39	 1.39	 1.35	 1.30	 1.22	 1.22	 1.22	 1.22	 1.22	 1.17	 1.30	 1.30	 1.28 
		migration
Non	farm	without		 		34	 1.02	 1.02	 1.02	 0.93	 0.75	 0.77	 0.70	 0.73	 0.77	 0.86	 0.95	 0.93	 0.87
		migration
Trapeang Russei	 Households Labor intensities (in men.month per household)
 involved (%) Dry season   Rainy season
	 	 Jan. Feb. March April May June July Aug. Sept. Oct. Nov. Dec. Average
Total	 100	 1.68	 1.58	 1.62	 1.61	 2.01	 2.61	 2.83	 2.83	 2.80	 2.50	 2.28	 2.00	 2.20
Agriculture/	 		88	 0.28	 0.17	 0.21	 0.21	 1.07	 1.98	 2.28	 2.28	 2.16	 1.48	 1.16	 0.81	 1.17
		livestock	
Fisheries	 				4	 1.00	 1.00	 1.00	 1.00	 1.00	 0.33	 0.33	 0.33	 0.33	 0.67	 0.67	 1.00	 0.72
Forestry	 		15	 1.40	 1.20	 1.20	 1.30	 0.30	 0.20	 0.20	 0.20	 0.60	 1.10	 1.20	 1.10	 0.83
Agricultural			 		15	 1.40	 1.50	 1.50	 1.40	 1.30	 1.50	 1.50	 1.50	 1.50	 1.60	 1.30	 1.40	 1.45
		wage	labor
Non-farm	with		 		40	 1.19	 1.22	 1.22	 1.19	 0.96	 0.74	 0.70	 0.70	 0.74	 0.96	 1.04	 1.00	 0.97
		migration
Non-farm	without				40	 1.19	 1.19	 1.19	 1.19	 0.96	 0.74	 0.70	 0.70	 0.70	 0.93	 1.07	 1.11	 0.97
		migration
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household,	 which	 is	 3.7	 active	 labor/household	 in	
Sravoy	 and	 3.8	 active	 labor/household	 in	 Trapeang	
Russei.	Table 3	 also	presents	 the	average	occupation	
of	the	labor	force	for	each	and	every	activity,	including	
the	 cases	where	 only	 the	 households	 are	 involved	 in	
each	specific	activity.
Rain-fed	 rice	 production	 is	 the	 pivotal	 activity	
of	nearly	all	 the	production	systems	 in	 terms	of	both	
labor	 requirements	 and	number	of	 families	 involved.	
Rice	 production	 is	 an	 intensive	 activity	 in	 terms	 of	
labor	 requirements	 during	 the	 crop	 cycles	 that	 are	
covering	a	total	period	of	eight	months	due	to	specific	




the	year.	This	 is	principally	due	 to	 the	 inexistence	or	

















labor	 productivity,	 very	 low	 levels	 of	mechanization	
and	the	self-subsistent	character	of	rice	production,	the	
diversification	options	that	households	can	grasp	depend	
largely	 on	 their	 demographic	 structure	 and	 potential.	
The	 reference	 to	 the	 demographic	 differentiation	 of	
Chayanov	is	then	crucial	to	distinguish	the	production	
system	 in	 the	 studied	area.	Household	 labor	capacity	
and	 the	 ability	 to	 diversify	 labor	 vary	 along	 the	
peasant	 life	 cycle	 as	 shown	 in	 figure 5.	 It	 increases	
until	 the	 households	 heads	 are	 aged	 50-55	 years	 old	
and	decreases	logically	afterwards,	when	the	children	
establish	their	own	households.	While	rice	production	
remains	 overall	 crucial	 for	 all,	 the	 households	 with	





activities	 in	 the	so-called	 recession-ponds	constituted	
after	 the	 flood	 water	 recedes)	 and	 self-employed	
non-farming	 activities	 within	 the	 commune	 (e.g.	
construction,	handicraft,	transport,	small	business,	etc.).	
The	proximity	to	both	the	flood	plain	and	to	Kampong	
Thom	 urban	 centre	 is	 a	 key	 factor	 that	 explains	 the	
interests	 and	 choice	 of	 households	 for	 extra-farming	
activities.	 Agricultural	 wage	 labor	 in	 the	 irrigated	




Penh	 to	work	 in	 garment	 factories	 or	 to	Thailand	 to	
work	 in	 factories	 or	 plantations.	 Computation	 of	
bi-variate	 correlations	 shows	 an	 actual	 negative	
association	 between	 household	 farming	 incomes	
and	 household	 income	 generated	 from	 non-farming	
activities	(correlation	coefficient	r2	=	-	0.174**,	highly	
significant).	While	the	correlation	between	the	farming	






female	 labor	 of	 each	 family	 and	 is	 less	 seasonally-
dependent	than	farming	sensu stricto.	It	consists	of	an	
investment	 strategy	 that	 engages	households	 in	more	
than	 simple	 reproduction.	 The	 importance	 of	 rural-
urban	migrations	suggests	that	migrants	from	peasant	
communities	are	key	bridges	between	rural	and	urban	
Figure 5. Family-based	 labor	 allocation	 per	 household	
and	 per	 class	 of	 household	 chiefs’	 age	 (by	 activity	
types)	—	Allocation de la main-d’œuvre familiale par 
ménage et par classe d’âge de chefs de ménages (ventilé par 
type d’activité).
Age classes of household 
chief (years)


















































































between	 farming	and	fisheries	 incomes	 (r2	=	 -0.061).	
Fisheries	need	to	be	understood	as	a	seasonal	tactic	to	
grasp	the	specific	seasonal	opportunities	offered	by	the	
natural	 resources	 and	 to	 allow	utilizing	 family	 labor.	
These	activities	provide	more	a	complementary	source	
of	 income	 rather	 than	 a	 substitute	 for	 weak	 farming	





opportunities	 in	 the	 cashew	 plantation.	The	 recourse	
to	 non-farming	 activities	 is	 also	more	 important	 due	
to	 more	 difficult	 cultivation	 environment.	 The	 soils	
are	much	more	weathered	(Acrisols)	and	not	annually	
enriched	with	alluviums	as	in	Srayov.	A	similar	income	
substitution	 effect	 is	 highlighted	 between	 farming	
and	non-farming	activities.	The	bi-variate	correlation	
coefficient	 between	 the	 farming	 and	 non-farming	
income	is	(r2	=	-	0.208**,	highly	significant).	As	with	
fisheries	 activities	 in	 Srayov,	 the	 income	 from	 forest	
resources	 (open-access	 and	 common	property)	 is	 not	





An	 analysis	 of	 income	 concentration	 using	
Lorenz	 curves	 and	Gini	 indexes	 shed	other	 lights	 on	
the	 diversification	 of	 productive	 activities.	 The	 first	
observation	 is	 the	 very	 strong	 concentration	 of	 cash	
income	 from	 agriculture	 (Gini	 coefficient	 of	 0.51	 in	
Srayov	 and	 0.50	 in	 Trapeang	 Russei),	 which	 is	 due	
to	 the	 concentration	 of	 agricultural	 land	 in	 the	 first	
place.	The	 income	 generated	 from	 the	 common-pool	
resources	and	non-farming	activities	in	both	communes	
shows	 higher	 levels	 of	 concentration	 (Figure 6)	 due	
to	 the	 fact	 that	 a	 smaller	 proportion	 of	 households	
actually	 practice	 these	 activities,	 which	 result	 in	
more	significant	concentration.	But,	 interestingly,	 the	
concentration	 of	 the	 total	 income	 presents	 a	 lower	
level	 of	 concentration	 (Gini	 coefficient	 of	 0.41	 and	
0.43	in	Srayov	and	Trapeang	Russei	respectively).	The	
modalities	 of	 distribution	 of	 the	 added	 value	 within	
the	peasant	communities	 results	 in	a	 reduction	 to	 the	
disparities	in	farming	income.
This	balancing	effect	of	farming	income	disparities	
results	 from	 a	 combined	 effect	 of	 two	 different	
dynamics	whose	nature	is	similar	in	both	communes.	
Firstly,	 though	 the	 access	 to	 common-pool	 resources	
mainly	 depends	 on	 the	 household	 demographic	
structure,	 the	 share	 of	 fisheries	 and	 forestry	 income	
is	 most	 important	 for	 the	 poorest	 households.	 The	
Gini	 Index	 of	 farming	 and	 common-pool	 resources	
incomes	 are	 respectively	 0.48	 and	 0.47	 in	 Srayov	
and	 Trapeang	 Russei.	 This	 suggests	 that	 the	 poorest	
households	actually	compensate	the	weakness	of	their	
total	income	by	accessing	the	common-pool	resources	
and	 the	 value-added	 from	 the	 integration	 of	 farming	
and	natural	resources	management	activities	resulting	
in	a	more	even	income	distribution	than	from	farming	
income	 alone.	 Secondly,	 the	 access	 to	 non-farming	
activities	 is	 conditioned	 by	 the	 age	 structure	 of	 the	
households	 but	 also	 depends	 on	 the	 availability	 of	
up-front	capital	 to	 invest	 in	non-farming	activities	as	
well	 as	 the	 access	 to	 information	 existing	 in	 specific	
social	networks.	The	later	is	key	when	considering	the	
imperfect	 labor	 market	 situation.	 Results	 show	 that	
non-farming	 income	 distribution	 follows	 a	 different	
trend,	 as	 the	 non-farming	 incomes	 represent	 an	
increasingly	important	share	of	the	income	as	the	total	




to	 non-farming	 is	 a	 long-term	 strategy	 for	 peasant	
households	 and	 is	 a	 driving	 force	 of	 socio-economic	
differentiation.	
3.3. Determinants of land and labor productivities 
in rain-fed rice production




in	 both	 Srayov	 and	 Trapeang	 Russei	 (in	 Srayov:	
mean	=	 1.66	ha,	 standard	 deviation:	 1.35	 and	 Gini	
Index:	0.41	and	 in	Trapeang	Russei:	mean	=	1.25	ha,	




Figure 6. Concentration	 –	 Gini	 indexes	 –	 of	 household	
incomes	(by	source	of	income)	—	Concentration – indices 
de Gini – des revenus par ménage (ventilés par source de 
revenu).
Non-farming in Srayov: 0.72
Non-farming in Trapeang Russei: 0.65
Total non-farming activities income (including wage labor)
Income derived from Common-Pool resources
Fisheries in Srayov: 0.63
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The	 acquisition	 of	 land	 by	 the	 State	 distribution	
(from	Krom Samaki)	and	by	inheritance	are	 the	most	
important	 ones.	 They	 are	 negatively	 correlated	 with	
each	other	as	they	are	associated	with	the	demographic	
cycle	 of	 the	 households.	This	 phenomenon	 is	 visible	
in	both	Srayov	and	Trapeang	Russei.	The	progressive	
disbandment	 of	 the	Krom Samaki	 system	 in	 the	mid	
eighties	 has	 resulted	 in	 the	 formal	 distribution	 of	
land	to	 the	households.	This	distribution	consisted	of	
redistributing	the	land	to	households	according	to	the	
number	 of	 active	 laborers	 in	 family.	 Equitable	 in	 its	
principle	 20	years	 ago,	 the	 distribution	 has	 initiated	
differences	 in	 land	 holdings	 that	 are	 visible	 today.	
Households	 with	 larger	 land	 holdings	 mainly	 got	
their	 land	 through	State	 redistribution.	The	bi-variate	
correlations	between	the	age	of	the	household	leader,	
the	 total	 land	 area	 and	 active	 labor	 are	 significant.	
It	 is	 noteworthy	 that	 the	 distribution	 of	 agricultural	
equipment	and	draught	animals	followed	logically	the	
same	patterns	as	most	farming	capital	was	redistributed	





through	 inheritance	 (negatively	 correlated	 with	 land	
area	received	by	Krom	Samaki).	The	double	age-biased	
phenomenon	 of	 land	 concentration	 and	 atomization	
is	 observable	 in	 Srayov	 and	 Trapeang	 Russei	 and	
confirmed	studies	conducted	in	similar	agro-ecological	
environments	(Ballard	et	al.,	2004).















companies	 or	 individuals	 on	State	 land,	 as	 described	
earlier,	 has	 made	 access	 to	 additional	 land	 through	
clearing	more	difficult.	





of	 2%	 of	 the	 total	 cultivated	 by	 peasant	 households	
consists	 of	 dry-season	 recession	 rice,	 and	 benefits	
from	a	natural	irrigation	system	with	the	recession	of	
Tonle	Sap	floodwater.	The	absence	of	ad hoc	irrigation	
equipment/drainage	 accessible	 to	 peasants	 limits	 the	
possibility	of	rice	production	to	one	cropping	season.	
The	 rice	 intensification	 index	 is	 1,	meaning	 that	 one	
plot	 bears	 one	 and	 only	 one	 crop	 a	 year.	 For	 these	
reasons,	only	rain-fed	rice	production	indicators	were	
computed	 and	 presented	 in	 table 4.	 The	 very	 weak	
control	 of	 water	 flowing	 in	 and	 out	 from	 May	 to	
October	causes	rice	production	to	fluctuate	largely	with	











ones	 with	 larger	 land	 holdings.	 Though	 they	 enjoy	
higher	land	productivity,	households	with	smaller	land	
holdings	 produce	 relatively	 less	 rice	 and	 sometimes	
acknowledge	food	shortages.	This	issue	concerns	45%	
Figure 7.	Distribution	of	agricultural	land	size	by	mode	of	
land	 acquisition	 for	 different	 classes	 of	 total	 agricultural	
land	size	—	Distribution de la taille des superficies de terre 
agricole pour différents modes d’acquisition et par classe de 
superficie agricole totale.
Classes of total 
agricultural land size (ha)
Classes of total 
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distribution (Krom Samaki)
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household	 is	 explained	 by	 a	 combination	 of	 two	
intensification	factors:	the	use	of	labor	and	the	use	of	
agricultural	inputs.
The	 intensity	 of	 labor	 is	 largely	 dependent	 on	
the	 household’s	 land-labor	 ratio.	 Households	 with	
relatively	 smaller	 land	 holdings	 are	 less	 limited	 by	
the	labor	they	can	provide	on	their	crop	than	by	their	
land	size,	which	is	in	this	case	the	dominant	productive	
constraint.	 These	 labor-abundant	 households	 are	
then	 in	 a	 position	 to	 use	 the	 productive	 factor	 they	
possess	in	relatively	greater	quantity.	As	the	land	area	
increases,	the	balance	of	the	land-labor	ratio	shifts	and	
labor	becomes	 the	 limiting	factor.	The	 land-abundant	
households	will	have	a	tendency	then	to	use	relatively	




for	 external	 labor.	 Furthermore,	 the	 database	 allows	




is	 preponderant	 for	 households	 with	 smaller	 land	
holdings,	while	external	labor	as	part	of	a	traditionally	
exchange	 group	 is	 more	 important	 for	 larger	 land	
holdings.	 Their	 logic	 will	 be	 to	 finalize,	 as	 fast	 as	
possible,	 the	 rice	 cultivation	work	without	 having	 to	
provide	labor	services	to	other	people’s	land.	The	freed	
labor	can	be	allocated	 to	other	activities.	Here	again,	
this	 logic	 will	 be	 followed	 by	 those	 peasants	 who	
actually	have	the	opportunity	to	allocate	their	labor	to	
other	activity.
For	 households	 with	 larger	 land	 holdings,	 food	
security	is	more	easily	ensured	due	to	higher	levels	of	
production.	The	higher	use	of	“Provas Day”	is	justified	
to	 limit	 monetary	 expenditure	 in	 the	 form	 of	 cash.	
On	 the	 basis	 of	 purely	 theoretical	 reasoning	 aiming	
to	 project	 on	 a	 temporal	 scale	what	 is	 observed	 in	 a	
spatial	scale,	a	possible	consequence	of	demographic	
pressure	and	lack	of	access	to	additional	land	will	be	
the	 tendency	 towards	 decreasing	 areas	 of	 cultivated	
land	accompanied	by	the	reinforcing	of	the	emergence	
of	wage	 laborer	pool.	Recent	 research	on	 reciprocity	
and	 social	 interactions	 underlines	 this	 trend	 (Kim,	
2001).	
The	 second	 factor	 of	 intensification	 that	 explains	
the	 higher	 yield	 for	 smaller	 land	 holding	 is	 a	 more	
important	 use	 of	 agricultural	 inputs	 (Table 4).	These	
agricultural	inputs	consist	mainly	of	equipment	rental,	
purchase	 of	 seeds,	 fertilizers	 and	 pesticides.	 On	
Table 4.	 Productivity,	 efficiency	 and	 profitability	 of	 wet	 season	 rice	 production	 by	 class	 of	 cultivated	 areas	 in	
Srayov	—	Productivité, efficience et rentabilité de la production de riz pluvial par classe de superficies cultivées à Srayov.
Land  Frequency  Total  Total  Production Productivity Efficiency Profitability
Class* of households production labor** costs*** Land Labor Cost price Gross margin
(ha)	 (%)	 (kg)	 (men.days	 (KHR.ha-1)	 (kg.ha-1)	(kg	per		 (KHR.kg-1)	(KHR)	 (KHR.ha-1)	 (KHR	per	
	 	 	 per	ha)	 	 	 men.days)	 	 	 	 men.days)
[0-0.5]	 18.8	 			447	 141	 368,123	 1,207	 		9	 305	 			178,743	 482,958	 		3,425
[0.5-1]	 26.2	 			708	 		68	 102,462	 			966	 14	 106	 			283,036	 386,428	 		5,683
[1-2]	 32.9	 1,404	 		65	 101,724	 			994	 15	 102	 			561,420	 397,444	 		6,115
[2-3]	 12.1	 1,578	 		44	 		65,688	 			690	 16	 		95	 			631,200	 275,990	 		6,272
[3-	>]	 10.1	 3,180	 		31	 		82,672	 			798	 26	 104	 1,272,000	 319,166	 10,296
*	harvested	land	—	superficie récoltée;	**family	+	external	labor	—	travail familial + travail extérieur;	***cash	costs	do	not	include	

































    0
Classes of cultivated areas (ha)
[0-0.5] [0.5-1] [1-2] [2-3] [3->]
Cash paid external labor per ha
Exchanged external labor as «Provas Day» per ha
Figure 8.	 Distribution	 of	 external	 labor	 modalities	 for	
rain-fed	rice	production	(by	class	of	cultivated	areas	for	all	
villages)	—	Distribution des modalités de travail extérieur 
pour la culture de riz pluvial (par classe de superficies 
cultivées pour tous les villages).
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a	 combined	 effect	 of	 the	 yield	 and	 production	 costs,	
is	 a	 reliable	 indicator	 of	 rice	 production	 efficiency	
(Table 4).	 The	 differential	 between	 the	 sale	 price	 at	
farm	 gate	 (435	KHR.kg-1	 in	 Srayov	 and	 407	KHR.
kg-1	 in	 Trapeang	 Russei)	 is	 always	 positive,	 which	
emphasizes	 that	 rice	 production	 is	 always	 efficient.	
Costs	price	values	always	show	the	highest	score	for	
land-scarce	 households.	 For	 households	with	 smaller	





households,	 the	 efficiency	 of	 production	 is	 better,	
though	 the	 results	 show	 important	 variability	 within	
each	class	identified.	Overall,	more	regular	and	quality-
driven	 extension	 services	 in	 agricultural	 support	 to	
farmers	is	genuinely	needed.	
In	 order	 to	 maximize	 their	 benefit,	 the	 peasants	
follow	different	production	logic,	in	step	with	the	means	
of	production	that	they	have	in	relatively	less	amount.	
The	 gross	 margin	 that	 gives	 the	 combined	 effect	 of	
differential	 of	 sale	 price	 and	 cost	 price	 and	 yield	
















	 supposedly	 the	 household	 with	 the	 smaller	 land-	
	 holding.	 These	 are	 the	 foundations	 of	 the	 so	
	 called	“growth	with	equity”	development	paradigm.	
	 Nevertheless,	 it	 must	 be	 made	 very	 clear	 which	
	 kind	 of	 efficiency	 is	 considered.	 Efficiency	 must	
	 be	addressed	in	step	with	the	limiting	factors	of	the	
	 households.	
3.4. Influence of land and credit markets 




the	 job	 opportunities	 offered	 to	 the	 rural	 population	
outside	 the	 purely	 farm	 sector	 are	 increasing	 (Chan	
et	 al.,	 2002).	 The	 labor	 markets	 outside	 agriculture	
are	 still	 very	much	 imperfect	 in	 rural	 areas	 and	 this	
imperfection	has	different	effects	on	rural	households.	




abundant	 and	 labor-buying	 households,	 imperfect	
labor	markets	mean	that	the	marginal	costs	of	labor	are	
above	 the	 market	 wage.	 Land-abundant	 households	




to	 sell	 or	 rent	out	 land	 to	 land-scarce	households,	 if	
access	 to	 technology	and	other	factors	of	production	
were	equal	between	these	two	groups	of	households.	
Land-scarce	 households	 would	 find	 themselves	
acquiring	land	through	the	market	and	land-abundant	
households	would	find	themselves	providing	land	on	
the	markets.	The	 land	markets	would	 thus	have	 two	
impacts:	 an	aggregate	productivity	effect	 that	would	
result	 as	 land	was	 transferred	 from	 lower	 valued	 to	
higher	valued	uses	and	an	income	distribution	effect	
resulting	 from	 the	 improved	 livelihood	 and	 the	
incomes	of	landscarce	households	(Carter,	2002).








Figure 9	 shows	 that	 land	 purchase	 cases	 are	
actually	 more	 important	 for	 landscarce	 households.	
This	reflects	the	necessity	for	land-scarce	households	
to	increase	their	land	holdings	for	livelihood	purposes.	
Even	 though	 this	observation	 seems	 in	 line	with	 the	
suggestion	 of	 the	 theoretical	 assumptions,	 it	 should	
be	 emphasized	 that	 the	 possibility	 of	 acquiring	 land	
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though	 land	 purchase	 depends	 for	 these	 households	
on	 the	 availability	 of	 capital	 in	 the	 first	 place.	 This	
is	 corroborated	 by	 a	 highly	 significant	 correlation	
between	the	total	income	and	the	total	purchased	land	
area	in	both	communes.
Compared	 with	 land	 purchase	 transactions,	
land	 sales	 are	 less	 frequent.	Nevertheless,	 the	 effect	
foreseen	by	the	theory	is	not	observed,	as	land	sales	are	
more	 frequent	 for	 land-scarce	 households.	Actually,	
74%	of	 land	sale	 transactions	are	motivated	by	non-
productive	 purposes	 (18%	 for	 health	 reasons,	 46%	
for	basic	household	expenditure	and	10%	to	actually	
reimburse	 a	 debt).	The	 factors	 that	 trigger	 land	 sale	
are,	 in	 the	 first	 place,	 associated	 with	 a	 context	 of	
vulnerability	and	does	not	depend	on	the	equalization	
of	 factors	 prices.	 Only	 26%	 of	 the	 land	 sales	 are	
motivated	 by	 productive	 purposes,	 generally	 to	
constitute	the	up-front	capital	to	launch	a	non-farming	
activity.	 Due	 to	 low	 natural	 fertility	 and	 weakness	




conditions,	 rice	 production	 has	 strong	 opportunity	
cost	 if	compared	with	other	activities.	And	 if	access	
to	 up-front	working	 capital	 is	 restricted,	 land-scarce	
households	prefer	to	sell	their	land.	Careful	attention	
should	 be	 given	 to	 both	 of	 these	 land	 sale	 contexts.	
In	 the	 absence	 of	 social	 security	 and	 with	 land	
fragmentation	 on	 the	 way	 (structural	 decrease	 of	




Observations	 on	 both	 land	 purchase	 and	 sale	
suggest	 strong	 linkages	 between	 land	 and	 financial	
markets.	
The	high	utilization	rate	of	credit	is	indeed	a	key	
feature	 of	 rural	 communities	 in	 the	 studied	 areas	
(Figure 10).	 Households	 contract	 a	 loan,	 use	 the	
money	 according	 to	 their	 needs,	 and	 pay	 it	 back	
whenever	and	wherever	there	is	a	surplus.	At	the	time	
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Figure 9. Frequency	of	 land	purchase	and	land	sale,	simulated	at	 the	 time	of	 transactions	(by	class	of	 land/labor	ratio)	—	 
Fréquences d’achat et de vente simulées au moment des transactions (par classe de ratio terre/travail).
Figure 10.	 Average	 amount	 of	 credit	 contracted	 per	
household	 and	 by	 class	 of	 total	 agricultural	 land	 size	 (by	
use	 of	 credit)	—		 Volume de crédit moyen contracté par 
ménage et par classe de superficie agricole totale (ventilé 
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of	the	investigation,	similar	percentages	of	households	
had	 outstanding	 credit	 in	 similar	 average	 volumes	
(48.3%	/	 546,638	KHR	 and	 48.4%	/	 482,967	KHR	
in	 Srayov	 and	 Trapeang	 Russei	 respectively).	
Households	 with	 smaller	 land	 holdings	 borrowed	
more	frequently	than	others	but	in	relatively	smaller	
amounts.	 They	 share	 this	 characteristic	 with	 most	
other	rural	communities	all	over	the	country	(Chan	et	
al.,	2002).	Indebtedness	and	reimbursements	are	part	
of	 the	 life	 cycle	 of	 the	 households	 and	 show	 signs	
of	 the	 vulnerability	 of	 peasant	 communities.	 Credit	
is	 accessible	 through	 various	 sources:	 37%	 from	
informal	sources	(usurer,	relatives,	saving	group)	and	
63%	from	formal	sources	 (banks	or	NGOs).	Access	
to	 credit	 is	 spatially	 differentiated:	 formal	 credit	 is	
preponderant	 in	 villages	 along	main	 transport	 axes,	
while	informal	sources	are	dominant	in	more	remote	
areas.	 When	 possible,	 households	 opt	 for	 formal	
credit	because	of	lower	interest	rates.














non-farming	 activities.	 The	 beneficial	 interactions	
offered	by	 land	as	collateral	 represent	both	 security	
for	 non-productive	 credits	 and	 opportunities	 for	
investment	 for	 productive	 credits.	 By	 a	 combining	
effect,	 credit	 can	 thus	 lead	 to	 accumulation	 in	 the	
farming	and	non-farming	sectors,	being	 in	 this	case	
a	 key	 factor	 of	 socio-economic	 differentiation	 as	 it	
provides	 a	mean	of	 capitalization	 and	 a	way	out	 of	
poverty	for	the	households	in	the	study	areas.
Land	 rental	 markets,	 contrary	 to	 land	 purchase	
and	sale,	are	 less	wealth	biased	and	seem	to	offer	a	
much	 more	 promising	 perspective	 for	 equal	 access	
to	 land	 (Figure 11).	 Households	 with	 smaller	 land	
holdings	relative	to	active	labor	tend	to	acquire	land	
through	 land	 rental	 more	 than	 the	 households	 with	
larger	land	holdings,	who	tend	more	to	allocate	their	
land	 to	 others	 through	 rental.	 Rental	 markets	 are	
in	 this	 case	 a	 factor	 that	 balances	 the	 disparities	 of	
land-labor	endowment	amongst	households	and	acts	
as	 a	 more	 equitable	 way	 to	 ensure	 access	 to	 land.	
Up-front	 working	 capital	 is	 also	 needed	 for	 these	
transactions	but,	interestingly,	the	observation	shows	
that	 sharecropping	 is	 largely	 preferred	 to	 cash	 rent	
in	 all	 villages	 of	 the	 studied	 areas.	 Sharecropping	
mechanisms	 allow	 for	 both	 households	 involved	 in	
the	rental	transaction	to	share	the	risk	associated	with	
possible	 crop	 failure	 due	 to	 irregular	 rainfall.	 This	
risk	sharing	behavior	is	a	key	element	of	safety	nets	
established	 by	 peasant	 communities	 to	 collectively	
face	 climate	 irregularities	 and	 the	 lack	 of	 State	
investment	in	agricultural	infrastructures.	
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Figure 11.	 Frequency	 of	 land	 leases	 (rent-in	 and	 rent-out),	 simulated	 at	 the	 time	 of	 transactions	 (by	 class	 of	 land/labor	
ratio)	—	Fréquence des transactions foncières de location, simulées au moment des transactions (par classe de ratio terre/
travail).
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4. DISCUSSION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
In	both	communes,	households	have	been	confronted	













adaptation	 is	 due	 to	 the	 strength	 and	great	flexibility	
peasants	 have	 in	 their	 decision-making	 processes.	
Coupled	 with	 an	 acute	 knowledge	 about	 local	 agro-
ecological	settings,	this	reflects	strong	adaptive	capacity	
in	a	context	of	quick	institutional	change.
In	 both	 communes,	 peasantry	 also	 shows	
considerable	 flexibility	 in	 the	 way	 they	 allocate	 the	
labor	 force	 to	 productive	 activities.	 The	 decision	
of	 labor	 allocation	 and	 consumption	 varies	 along	
life	 cycles	 and	 depends	 on	 the	 evolution	 of	 the	
demographic	 dependency	 ratio	 of	 the	 families.	Their	
flexibility	in	decision-making	and	intimate	knowledge	
of	their	environment	allow		them	to	respond	quickly	to	
opportunities	 and	 constraints	 in	 their	 agro-ecological	
and	 institutional	 environment	 in	 order	 to	 maximize	
the	employment	level	of	their	family	members,	which	
is	their	final	aim.	In	the	context	of	an	imperfect	labor	
market,	 this	 flexible	 allocation	 of	 labor	 occupation	
according	 to	 the	 seasonal	 and	 random	 character	 of	
agriculture	actually	results	from	a	permanent	fluctuation	
of	 labor	 opportunity	 costs	 due	 to	 the	 emergence	 of	
specific	 opportunities	 for	 self-employment	 or	 wage	
labor.	 The	 genuine	 asset	 of	 peasantry	 is	 to	 adapt	 to	
the	 evolution	 of	 the	 labor	 opportunity	 costs	 and	 to	
relocate	 their	 family	 labor	accordingly.	 In	 this	 sense,	
peasant	communities	are	key	managers	of	rural-urban	
migration	 flows.	 Arguably,	 this	 flexibility	 allows	
peasantry	 investing	 time	 in	 non-profitable	 activities	
such	as	the	ritual	celebrations	during	the	Khmer	New	
Year	 in	April	 which	 are	 crucial	 in	 building	 peasant	
collectivity	 and	 strengthening	 the	 social	 capital	 in	
peasant	communities.	Overall,	the	peasant	communities	
offer	modalities	 for	 labor	 allocation	 that	 are	 socially	
just,	as	 the	 total	 income	derived	 from	 the	 integration	
of	these	activities	presents	concentration	values	lower	





community-based	 natural	 resources	 management	






from	 an	 open	 access	 regime	 to	 a	 common	 property	






the	 common-pool	 resources,	 the	 important	 territorial	
added	value	they	generate	and	the	overall	management	





that	 regulates	 the	 access,	 the	 use	 and	 control	 of	 the	
resources.	Fishing	or	forestry	activities	do	not	have	to	
be	 considered	 independently	 of	 grazing	or	 collection	
of	 non-timber	 forest	 products.	 The	 time-consuming	
involvement	 in	 fisheries	 grounds	 or	 forest	 protection	
by	the	members,	which	is	a	main	constraint	for	these	
kinds	 of	 common	 property	 institutions,	 would	 most	
likely	 be	 recompensed	 by	 the	 possibility	 of	 deriving	
other	 benefits.	 A	 compartmentalized	 approach	 that	
results	 from	 a	 sector	 vision	 should	 be	 avoided,	 as	 it	
would	 not	 address	 the	 problems	 associated	 with	 the	
interactions	of	rural	activities,	which	is	the	true	nature	
of	an	agrarian	system.
This	 endogenous	 management	 of	 the	 so-called	
State	land	is	critically	challenged	by	the	involvement	
of	 non-peasant	 actors	 in	 rural	 development.	 Under	
their	influence,	large	parts	of	State	domain	of	land	are	





In	 the	 studied	areas,	 their	 action	actually	 results	 in	 a	
decrease	 in	 land	 security	 for	 peasant	 communities.	
This	 paradox	 illustrates	 the	 inadequacies	 of	 a	 very	
quick	 conversion	 of	 natural	 and	 social	 capital	 into	
economic	 capital,	 on	 the	 one	 hand,	 and,	 at	 the	 same	
time,	 a	very	 slow	maturing	of	property	 rights	on	 the	
other.	 Combined	 with	 steady	 demographic	 pressure	
on	 land	 and	 subsequent	 land	 fragmentation	 due	 to	
inheritance,	 this	mode	of	State	 land	management	has	
created	 a	 structural	 land	 access	 problem	 for	 peasant	
households	who	still	largely	depend	on	agriculture	for	
their	livelihood:	their	land	holding	size	decreases	while	
large	areas	of	State	 land	 remain	under-utilized	 in	 the	





The	 peasant	 tends	 always	 to	 maximize	 their	
income	in	step	with	the	production	factor	they	are	able	
to	 dispose	 in	 relatively	 less	 quantity.	The	 productive	







considering	 the	 factors	 that	determine	 the	fluctuation	
of	 their	 opportunity	 costs	 (Dufumier,	 2004).	 The	




ultimately	 on	 two	 factors:	 the	 access	 to	 credit	 for	
up-front	capital	and	the	integration	into	ad hoc	social	
network.
Land	purchase	 and	 sale	markets	 are	 very	wealth-
biased	and	depend	to	a	large	extent	on	economic	power.	
It	is	not	likely	indeed	that	land	purchases	and	sales	will	





land-based	 food	security	 is	not	easily	ensured	due	 to	
land	fragmentation	and	difficulty	in	gaining	access	to	
additional	land	by	clearance	or	purchase.	Transfers	of	
secondary	 right	 through	 land	 leases	 amongst	peasant	
households	 seem	 promising	 to	 ensure	 equitable	
access	 to	 land	 also	 because	 they	 are	 embedded	 in	
collective	 security	 mechanisms	 activated	 by	 peasant	




lities	 to	 access	 land,	 including	 secondary	 rights	 such	
as	land	leases.
5. CONCLUSION
Relations	 between	 the	 State,	 the	 peasantry	 and	 the	
markets	 lie	 in	 an	 institutional	 crisis.	 Recent	 rural	
development	 policies	 offer	 a	 poor	 synthesis	 of	
peasant	 rationalities	 and	 capture	 only	 poorly	 the	
real	 dynamism	 of	 peasant	 communities.	 Thus	 far,	
the	 peasant	 contribution	 to	 the	 development	 of	 the	
rural	 landscape	 has	 been	 largely	 underestimated.	 A	





their	 income	 in	 step	 with	 their	 most	 limiting	 factor	
of	production	are	economically	sound.	In	a	gradually	
industrializing	 economy	and	 in	 an	overall	 context	 of	
low	 agricultural	 labor	 productivity,	 peasantry	 tends	
to	maximize	 the	employment	 rate	of	 their	household	
labor	 force.	 They	 do	 so	 according	 to	 fluctuations	 in	
the	 costs	 of	 labor.	 Peasant	 communities	 offer	 viable	
options	for	social	justice	in	the	distribution	of	the	added	
value	 generated	 by	 different	 activities.	 Endogenous	
practices	 for	 common-pool	 resources	 management	
are	environmentally	sound.	Peasant	communities	also	
offer	 spaces	 for	 collective	 action	 that	 are	 culturally	
balanced.	The	key	aspects	of	peasant’s	 rationality	 lie	
in	 the	 nexus	 between	 production	 and	 consumption.	
Peasants	aim	at	managing	the	access	to	a	diversity	of	
productive	and	non-productive	activities	and	practices	
whose	 norms	 are	 local,	 regional	 or	 international	
in	 order	 to	 ensure	 a	 good	 individual	 and	 family	 life	
in	 the	 frame	 of	 a	 collectivity	 that	 is	 able	 to	 ensure	
security	and	sustainability.	This	being	said,	it	is	clear	
that	peasant	communities	are	exposed	to	factors,	both	
endogenous	and	external,	 that	challenge	 the	 integrity	
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